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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1911 
____________ 
 
JINESH JASHBHAI PATEL;  
SHILPA BEN JINESH KUMAR PATEL;  
POOJA JINESH KUMAR PATEL, 
   Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 __________________________________ 
 
Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A079-326-664, A079-326-665, A079-326-666) 
Immigration Judge: Alberto J. Riefkohl 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 11, 2013 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jinesh Jashbhai Patel, his wife Shilpa Ben Jinesh Patel and daughter Pooja Jinesh 
Kumar Patel, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order of 
removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
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 The Patels are citizens of Kenya but they are natives of India and Hindus.  They 
were admitted to the United States in November, 2000 as non-immigrant visitors and 
overstayed.  On June 21, 2001, Jinesh Patel filed an application for asylum, claiming that 
he feared that he and his family would be harmed in Kenya because of their nationality 
and religion.  On July 30, 2001, the former Immigration & Naturalization Service served 
the family with Notices to Appear, which charged that they are removable pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for remaining in the United States for a time longer than 
permitted.
1
  On August 30, 2001, the Patels appeared in Immigration Court and conceded 
that they are removable as charged.  Later when their attorney failed to appear, they were 
ordered removed, but they were successful in getting their case reopened.  Thereafter, 
their separate applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture were considered on the merits. 
 In support of the family’s claims, Jinesh Patel testified that he and his wife lived 
happily and prosperously in Kenya for many years.  He owned two printing businesses 
and a photo processing lab in the cities of Mombasa and Malindi.  Things changed during 
the 1997 Kenyan parliamentary elections, when he was printing for everyone who was 
standing for election, including an opponent of the incumbent Minister of Parliament, 
Sharif Nasir from the KANU political party.  Patel testified that Nasir came to his store, 
complained that he (Patel) was supporting the opposition, and threatened to kill him.  
Nasir declared that Patel was not supposed to be in Kenya.  In May, 1998, Patel became 
                                              
1
 The Patels have a second daughter who is a United States citizen and is not in removal 
proceedings. 
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aware of a growing hostility by native Kenyans toward the more prosperous Indian 
community.  He learned that someone was shot dead in his shop.  In April, 1999, he was 
extorted by two individuals posing as police officers.  To avoid being arrested and falsely 
charged with receiving stolen property, Patel, with the help of a friend, negotiated a 
payment of 40,000 shillings; the extortionists took the money and left.  On May 30, 1999, 
five strangers came to his photo shop and one of them put a gun to his head.  These 
individuals kicked Patel in the stomach, insulted him with racial slurs, threatened to hurt 
him if he went to the police, and robbed the store of cash and cameras, allowing only an 
ethnic African customer to keep his expensive camera. 
 After this robbery, Patel called the police, who came to the shop but would not 
dust for fingerprints, stating that it would not help.  Immediately after reporting this 
robbery, Patel and his wife began receiving numerous daily anonymous telephone calls, 
in which the caller threatened to kill them and kidnap their daughter.  Patel went to the 
police station where he was told to stop worrying.  There was no progress regarding the 
May, 1999 robbery and Patel began to doubt that the police were going to help him.  The 
calls continued, and, in July, 1999, Shilpa, who was then six months pregnant, was 
attacked on the street and thrown to the ground, a knife was put to her throat, and her 
attackers began to tear her clothes.  She screamed for help, and, although native Kenyan 
bystanders would not come to her aid, her attackers eventually fled after stealing her 
necklace.  Patel and Shilpa reported the attack to the police but they would not send an 
officer because they did not have an available police car. 
4 
 
 On September, 4, 1999, Patel was working late at night in his photo processing 
shop when two police officers came in and harassed him until he gave them the money in 
his cash register.  Patel chose not to report the incident to the police because he did not 
believe they would help.  On September 7, 1999, Patel discovered that the locks on the 
photo shop had been cut off and the store had been completely cleaned out.  The security 
guard Patel had hired to watch the shop was gone, along with most all of the equipment.  
Patel called the police, who examined the scene and made a report but again declined to 
dust for fingerprints.  Thereafter, the family continued to receive threatening telephone 
calls.  Patel was aware that some Kenyan politicians were fanning ethnic animosity.  He 
spent the next year winding up his business affairs and then departed Kenya for the 
United States. 
Shilpa Patel also testified, and she corroborated the attempted rape incident.  The 
Patels submitted background evidence concerning the past and current relationship 
between the ethnic Indian business community and native Kenyans, including newspaper 
articles reporting on crimes against business owners.  They also submitted police reports 
dated May 30, 1999 and October 7, 1999, an insurance claim dated September 16, 1999, 
and affidavits from family and friends.  
 On January 10, 2011, the Immigration Judge issued a written decision, denying the 
Patels’ applications.  The IJ found that the Patels were credible (although he noted 
several inconsistencies in their case), and that they had provided corroboration for their 
claim, but concluded that they had failed to meet their burden of proof because the harm 
they suffered in Kenya was not so severe as to constitute persecution.  The IJ determined 
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that the telephone threats and the one in-person threat by Nasir were neither highly 
imminent nor particularly menacing, citing Li v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 400 F.3d 157, 
164 (3d Cir. 2005), and the Patels had failed to show that any of the subsequent incidents 
were linked to Nasir and his imputed political opinion threat.  The IJ determined that the 
incidents of robbery, harassment, extortion, and burglary also did not amount to 
persecution, citing Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  The Patels received only minor injuries, and crimes directed at the wealthy 
and indicative of general lawlessness and violence do not establish a claim for asylum 
under the Immigration & Nationality Act, see Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 533 (3d Cir. 
2005).  The Patels failed to show that the burglary, thefts, and robbery were motivated, 
even in part, by their ethnicity, religion, or political opinion, imputed or otherwise; 
instead, the evidence showed resentment toward the Patels because of their wealth.  
Moreover, the Kenyan police, although inept, responded or at least tried to respond to the 
Patels’ calls for assistance.  Accordingly, the Patels did not show past persecution.   
The Immigration Judge also concluded that the Patels did not demonstrate a well-
founded fear of future persecution because the objective evidence did not establish that 
they would be singled out for persecution by the Kenyan government on account of a 
protected ground.  Noting the Patels’ background evidence regarding the 2007 election-
related violence, the IJ concluded that the Patels did not prove that their alleged 
persecutors from 10 years ago would still have any interest in them.  Moreover, the 
election violence ended in 2008 when the two sides agreed to form a coalition 
government.  Referring to the 2009 State Department Country Report, the IJ further 
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concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that there existed a pattern or 
practice of persecution of Kenya’s prosperous minority ethnic Indian population.  The IJ 
denied the Patels’ claim for withholding of removal, and further concluded that they had 
not shown that it is more likely than not that they would be tortured by or with the 
consent of the Kenyan government.  The IJ ordered the Patels removed to Kenya, with an 
alternative order of removal to India. 
 The Patels appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that the IJ did 
not give sufficient weight to their testimony and evidence, the IJ erred in concluding that 
their pattern or practice claim lacked merit, the IJ exceeded his authority in violation of 
their right to due process, and the IJ engaged in improper speculation.   
On March 6, 2012, the Board affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal, 
concluding that the IJ correctly found that the Patels did not prove harm amounting to 
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.  The Board concluded that 
the IJ did not violate the Patels’ due process rights because he did not base his decision 
on personal opinion or speculation, and the IJ did not fail to give sufficient weight to the 
Patels’ evidence.  The Board noted its agreement with the IJ that the Patels suffered no 
serious harm amounting to persecution; that the threats they received were not so 
imminent as to constitute persecution; and that they did not present sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that any harm they suffered was on account of their race, social group, or 
religion.  Although the evidence showed that violent crime by native Kenyans, including 
robbery, kidnapping, extortion, and murder, was common in Kenya, and that the victims 
were frequently Indian, it did not show that the criminals were motivated by anything 
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other than money, and for this reason the Patels did not show a well-founded fear of 
persecution based on a protected ground.  The 2009 Country Report showed a high level 
of crime and violence in Kenya, but the generalized lawlessness was not a pattern or 
practice of persecution related to any protected category, and, in any event, the evidence 
indicated that the Kenyan government does not ignore ethnic violence, and was 
attempting to fight the crime, even if its efforts have not been effective.  The Board 
affirmed the IJ’s statutory withholding of removal and CAT conclusions. 
The Patels have petitioned for review of the Board’s decision.  We have 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1).  The Patels have argued in their opening 
brief that the agency erred in concluding that they did not meet their burden of proof, and 
the agency violated procedural due process when it ignored evidence which had not been 
fully developed because the IJ adjourned the initially scheduled hearing at which 
witnesses from far away were present to testify. 
 We will deny the petition for review.  We consider both the Board’s and the IJ’s 
decisions where the Board substantially relies on the IJ’s decision, as it did here.  Kaita v 
Att’y Gen of the U.S., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008).  The agency’s factual 
determinations are upheld if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).  Under this deferential standard, the petitioner 
must establish that the evidence does not just support a contrary conclusion but compels 
it.  See id. at 481 n.1; Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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The Immigration & Nationality Act gives the Attorney General discretion to grant 
asylum to any person who is unable or unwilling to return to his country “because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A).  The applicant has the burden of proof.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a).  An 
asylum applicant must show either that he has been subject to past persecution or has a 
well-founded fear of future persecution, and the persecution must be on account of one of 
the five statutory bases.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b).  It is presumed that an applicant who 
establishes that he suffered past persecution has a well-founded fear of persecution, see 
id. at § 1208.13(b)(1), but if the applicant cannot show past persecution, he may still 
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution by demonstrating a subjective fear of 
persecution, and that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution if 
returned to the country in question, Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
The record in the Patels’ case does not compel the conclusion that they suffered 
persecution in Kenya prior to coming to the United States.  Persecution is defined as 
“threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they 
constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  Kibinda v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 477 F.3d 113, 119 
(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240).  It refers only to “severe” conduct and 
“does not encompass all treatment our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful 
or unconstitutional.”  Id.  As the agency determined, the Patels were victims of crime; 
their businesses were robbed and burglarized and Mrs. Patel was violently assaulted 
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when she was six months pregnant.  The Patels did not claim that they were seriously 
physically injured, and, although they were upset and suffered financial losses, the upset 
and economic loss resulting from these events was not so extreme that it constituted 
persecution.  See Konan v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 432 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(mere generalized violence and lawlessness are not sufficient basis for grant of asylum).  
Similarly, the threats and harassment the Patels experienced were insufficient to establish 
persecution.  See Li, 400 F.3d at 164 (“[U]nfulfilled threats must be of a highly imminent 
and menacing nature in order to constitute persecution.”)  The telephone threats and the 
threat by Nasir were not highly imminent.  Moreover, although Nasir’s threat may have 
imputed a political opinion to Mr. Patel, there was a complete failure to show that any of 
the subsequent incidents were linked to Nasir and his threat.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b) 
(persecution must be on account of one of the five statutory bases); Singh v. Gonzales, 
406 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2005) (applicant must show that persecution was caused at 
least in part by one of protected characteristics).  The Patels’ argument linking the 
incidents together and attempting to show that they signified something other than a 
string of opportunistic crimes, see Petitioner’s Brief, at 10, is speculative at best. 
For similar reasons, the record does not compel the conclusion that the Patels have 
a well-founded fear of persecution.  To establish a well-founded fear of persecution, the 
Patels had to prove either that they will be individually targeted for persecution in Kenya, 
or prove that there is a pattern or practice of persecution in Kenya of the minority 
population of Indian Hindus.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii), (iii)(A).  The record does not 
compel the conclusion that the Patels will be individually targeted for persecution in 
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Kenya in the future.  The telephone threats and criminal acts occurred more than 10 years 
ago and the Patels pointed to no specific person who would now be interested in harming 
them.  The election-related violence in 2007, which has long since abated, does not 
objectively prove that the Patels will be singled out for future harm because they are 
ethnic Indian Hindus.  In short, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination 
that the Patels’ evidence was insufficient with respect to motivation based on ethnicity 
and religion.  see Lie, 396 F.3d at 535.  The evidence showed only that robberies and 
thefts directed at the prosperous Indian community are opportunistic and motivated by a 
desire for money. 
In addition, the 2009 Country Report does not, as the agency concluded, support a 
conclusion that there exists a pattern or practice of persecution of Kenya’s ethnic Indian 
Hindus.  The Country Reports show that crime is rampant in Kenya and that the police 
are ineffective and possibly also corrupt, but the evidence presented by the Patels is not 
meaningfully different from that presented in Lie, which concerned attacks by native 
Muslim Indonesians against the more prosperous Chinese Christian community.  There 
we held that the attacks were perpetrated by individuals and were not the result of 
government action or acquiescence, and thus the pattern or practice argument failed.  396 
F.3d at 537-38.  The same reasoning applies to the Patels’ pattern or practice claim.  
Violence or other harm perpetrated by civilians against the applicant’s group does not 
constitute persecution unless such acts are “committed by the government or forces the 
government is either unable or unwilling to control.”  Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 
587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks removed).  Substantial evidence 
11 
 
supports the agency’s determination in the Patels’ case that the Kenyan government does 
not ignore crime directed at prosperous Indian businesses. 
Because the Patels failed to show past persecution or a reasonable fear of future 
persecution under the lower burden of proof required for asylum, they are necessarily 
ineligible for withholding of removal.  See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-32 (1987).  In addition, the agency held that the 
Patels did not meet their burden of establishing that it is more likely than not that they 
will be tortured in Kenya, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16, 1208.18, and the record does not compel 
a different conclusion.   
Last, we lack jurisdiction to consider the Patels’ procedural due process claim.  An 
asylum applicant must exhaust all administrative remedies available as a prerequisite to 
raising a claim before this Court.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 
422 (3d Cir. 2005).  Failure to present an issue to the agency constitutes a failure to 
exhaust.  See Lin v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 543 F.3d 114, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2008).  We have 
carefully reviewed the Patels’ brief on appeal to the Board, as well as their notice of 
appeal to the Board, see generally Petitioner’s Reply Brief, at 6, but we disagree with 
their argument that as a matter of fact they raised a claim before the Board that their 
procedural due process rights were violated when the IJ adjourned a scheduled hearing 
and certain witnesses were not allowed to give testimony.  Moreover, the claim is 
correctable through the administrative process, and thus fully subject to the exhaustion 
requirement.  See Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
